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Legal Constraints for the Protection of
Privacy and Personal Data in Electronic
Evidence Handling1
MARÍA VERÓNICA PÉREZ ASINARI
ABSTRACT This paper describes the application of personal data protection rules
in the process of e-evidence handling. It focuses mainly on the application of
Directive 95/46/EC rules to the digital environment. It also makes reference to the
legal risks derived from the collection and processing of e-evidence in violation of
privacy and personal data protection law.
Introduction
Our objective in the CTOSE (Cyber Tools for On-line Search for Evidence) project was to
describe the general legal framework and constraints for the protection of privacy and
personal data for evidence handling and consider the CTOSE Process Model designed in
Work Package 1.2
Electronic evidence handling (the way it is captured, analysed, stored, managed and
presented for investigation) has to be compliant with European Union (EU), International
and National legislation to be admissible in the context of a dispute3 (principe de la
régularité des preuves).
Apart from procedural law requirements (applicable in the off-line and on-line worlds),
special attention must be paid to the privacy and data protection legal framework. An
enormous amount of personal data from Internet users is collected on the Internet by
different actors, through different mechanisms.4 At times the user is aware of this
collection5 and sometimes not. Sometimes this collection (and further processing) is lawful
and sometimes not.
In case of a dispute, this data could be constituted as electronic evidence. For this
evidence to be admissible it must have been obtained (and processed in general) lawfully.
This means that the part of this data that can be considered as ‘personal data’ must be
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processed (before, during and after the disputed event) in compliance with the applicable
legislation protecting it, at national, international and supranational level.
It is important to bear in mind that the subject matter of this paper is mainly a question
of fundamental rights. For this reason, it is not possible to make definitive assumptions.
Most of the questions that can be formulated in the context of CTOSE dealing with
personal data protection have to be analysed from a case-by-case approach, because of the
casuistic nature of the topic under study. Moreover, considering that this field of law is
embedded in public order principles, final interpretation will always be given by a judge.
In this paper, we will consider Directive 95/46/EC6 in the light of electronic evidence
handling. Further, we will present a brief overview of the legal risks derived from the
violation of data protection legislation.
The Running Phase. Scope of Application of Directive 95/46/EC
Deliverable 1.4 of the CTOSE project has defined the ‘running phase’ of CTOSE process
model (CPM) as the normal state of a computer system.7
During the running phase data controllers will have to comply with Directive 95/46/EC
(its transpositions to national laws) when processing personal data, in general, and
electronic evidence (that presents personal data), in particular. In what follows, we will
analyse its content.
The delimitation of the scope of application is important in order to attempt to assess
questions such as who, for doing what, and where, has to respect the above-mentioned
Directive.
Personal Scope of Application
The ‘data subject’. The ‘data subject’ is the person to whom the data relates. Directive
95/46/EC is applicable only to natural persons. Nevertheless, some national laws extend the
protection to legal persons (e.g. Italy). Directive 2002/58/EC8 is applicable to ‘the legitimate
interests of subscribers who are legal persons’.9
The ‘data controller’. The ‘controller’ is the ‘natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body, which alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; […]’.10 This is the person who has legal
responsibilities vis-à-vis the data subject and public authorities. For instance, in the case of
a company, it will not be the system administrator, the controller of the personal data
processed through the company website, but the director of the company, because he
decides the ‘purposes and means’ of this processing activity. However, it may happen that
the system administrator has more autonomy in processing decisions, so this person would
be considered the controller.
The ‘data processor’. The ‘processor’ is ‘a natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body, which processes personal data on behalf of the controller’.11 A
processor does not have direct obligations vis-à-vis the data subject. The processor and the
persons acting under his authority have a confidentiality obligation.12 A contract will be
necessary between the controller and the processor in order to carry out processing
activities.13
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Material Scope of Application
The Directive is applicable to the ‘processing’ of ‘personal data’.
What are ‘processing’ activities? Processing of personal data involves ‘any operation or set
of operations, which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means,
such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’.14
The collection of personal data on the Internet falls within this concept and therefore it
has to be considered in the light of both Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC.15
What is ‘personal data’? Considering that the CTOSE project was developed exclusively
for matters concerning ‘electronic’ evidence, we will first make reference to the environ-
ment in which we will find the e-evidence and the personal data connected to it. In this
sense, we will connect the concept of personal data with the digital world.
Background: the digital world. An ‘information system’ can be defined as ‘computers and
electronic communication networks, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved
or transmitted by them for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and mainte-
nance’.16
Computer data can eventually become electronic evidence, because, given a disputed
event, ‘facts [will] tend to be proved’ using this ‘information’.17
The Internet18 is a network of computers communicating with each other on the basis of
the Internet protocol (TCP/IP).
While for the facility of users, Internet names are commonly represented by textual
domain names, the underlying addresses that are used to route data from one host
computer to another are numeric.19 On the Internet, every computer is identified by a single
IP address. This numeric system is currently based on numbers that are 32 bits long (IPv4).
All Internet applications, both current and future, rely on these addresses. An IP network
is based on the transmission of small packets of information. Each packet includes the IP
address of the sender and of the recipient.
Internet Access Providers (IAPs) give IPs connection to individuals or organizations (that
includes IP address and connectivity). By giving ‘connectivity’ the IAP guarantees two
things: that it will route the packets sent by the client to the final destination and that the
packets sent to the client will be routed to him/her as well. Individuals may use a modem
(analog modem or DSL—Dynamic System Line) or a terminal adapter (ISDN). In this case
the subscriber will receive an IP address for the duration of his/her connection and this
address will probably change the next time they dial up. This is called a dynamic IP
address. In the case of a connection by ADSL or via video cable, the IP address can be either
static or dynamic.
In order to obtain a connection, the individual has to conclude a contract and give his
name, address and other personal data. At least for security reasons, the IAPs usually ‘log’
the date, time, duration and dynamic IP address given to the Internet user in a file.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) provide services to individuals and companies on the
Web. They own or hire a permanent IP connection and use servers permanently connected
to the Internet. Classically, they will offer web hosting, access to newsgroups, access to an
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Figure 1. The logfile
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) server and electronic mail. This involves one or more servers
using HTTP, NNTP, FTP, SMTP and POP3 protocols.
In the case of HTTP servers a logbook or logfile is systematically created by default and
contains some of the data present in the HTTP request header (browser chattering) and the
IP address. The logbook is standard practice and is created by each web server.
A logfile may look similar to that shown in Figure 1 (it depends on the web server
software and on the configuration).20
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Figure 2. The results obtained when introducing our IP number in the RIPE Whois database
Determining the origin of a packet on the Internet is usually as simple as inspecting the
packet and extracting the source address. The ownership of the IP address can then be
determined by using the ‘Whois’ service21 to interrogate the regional registry databases that
describe IP address allocations.22 This file or ‘logbook’ can be used, given an electronic
disputed event, to ‘try’ to demonstrate ‘who’ made ‘what’ and ‘when’.
But, in order to analyse what is the connection of this reality with the Data Protection
legislation, we have to know if the data contained in the logfiles can be considered ‘personal
data’, since, if this is the case, Directive 95/46/EC will be applicable, giving place to a series
of rights to the data subject and obligations to the data controller.
In Figure 2, we can see the results obtained when introducing our IP number in the RIPE
Whois database. Indeed, we can see who has attributed this number and their contact
details.
The concept of ‘personal data’. Personal data is ‘any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (data subject). An identifiable person is one who
can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity’.23
This definition has to be understood jointly with Recital 26 of the Directive: ‘Whereas
the principles of protection must apply to any information concerning an identified or
identifiable person; whereas, to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should
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be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any
other person to identify the said person; […]’.
When it is technically possible to identify the concerned persons, the data involved has
to be considered as ‘personal data’.24 This appreciation has to be made in concreto. If the
data user alleges that the data is anonymous because it is technically impossible to connect
it to other data in order to determine the individual concerned, or that the procedure is
excessively costly, he has the burden of proof as regards this possibility and he has to
submit evidence to demonstrate that fact.25
Can an IP address be identified as ‘personal data’? A sole number, can not be considered,
as such, ‘personal data’, unless it could be connected to other information in order to
identify a person. If we find a paper on the street, with a series of numbers written, this will
not be identified as ‘personal data’. If the numbers have the acronym ‘GSM’ written in front,
that could be ‘personal data’ since it is potentially26 possible to identify the person to whom
this GSM number belongs by requesting the information from the service provider.
As Article 29 (‘Working Party’) has noted, IAPs and managers of the Local Area
Networks (LANs), are potentially able, by using reasonable means, to identify Internet
users to whom they have attributed IP addresses as they normally systematically ‘log’ in a
file the date, time, duration and dynamic or static IP address given to the Internet user.
They only have to connect this data, with the data of the user/s who have signed the
contract for the provision of the service.
System administrators keep a logbook of the HTTP server. Even if they are not normally
able to identify directly who is the user behind the IP address (when the user is ‘external’),
they can identify the IAP, who has given it, by checking in the appropriate registry: RIPE,
ARIN or APNIC, etc.27 By knowing the IAP, it is then, potentially possible to connect the
IP address—recorded on the system administrator logfile—to the name and other data of
the user/client of the IAP. Here, we have to remember Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC,
and the reference to ‘means likely reasonable to be used either by the controller or by any
other person to identify the said person’.
The procedure described above for user identification, does not seem unreasonable,
excessively costly or difficult. In this case, the identification would not be done by the
controller (the person who has collected the IP address, a website administrator, for
instance) but by a third person (the IAP). In principle, a warrant issued by a judge will be
necessary to legally make this connection.
In such a case, there is no doubt that one can talk about personal data in the sense of
the Directive. Notwithstanding, this data will be ‘personal data’ as far as the IAP stores the
logfiles, through which it is possible to make this connection. As soon as these logfiles are
deleted, the IP addresses stored in the logfiles of the web administrators become ‘anony-
mous data’28 and Directive 95/46/EC is no longer applicable.
In other cases, a third party can get to know the dynamic IP address of a user but not
be able to link it to other data concerning this person that would make their identification
possible.29 It is obviously easier to identify Internet users who make use of static IP
addresses.
The possibility also exists that the user’s IP address can be linked to other personal data
(which may or may not be publicly available) that identifies him/her, especially if use is
made of invisible processing means to collect additional data on the user (for instance,
using cookies containing a unique identifier) or modern data mining systems linked to large
data bases containing personally-identifiable data on the Internet users.30
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Protocol IPv6,31 the next generation of the Internet, raises a specific concern because of
the possibility of the integration of a unique identification number in the IP address.32 The
IP address will not be attributed aleatory, but it will be constituted in part by the serial
number of the LAN card in the computer.33
As a consequence of this reasoning, data protection legislation, would be applicable to
the processing of IP addresses done through logfiles, in those cases where IP addresses34 can
be considered personal data.35
Example of IP address considered as personal data. An example of the application of
the reasoning described above can be found in the opinion issued by the Belgian Data
Protection Authority ‘Avis d’initiative concernant la compatibilité de la recherche
d’infractions au droit d’auteur commises sur Internet avec les dispositions juridiques
protégeant les données à caractère personnel et les télécommunications‘.
In this case, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) in Belgium
had investigated Belgian users who uploaded or downloaded Belgian artists’ songs in the
Napster Internet site. In order to do so, a representative from IFPI registered himself via a
pseudonym to visualize the list of netizens who shared the songs of a Belgian artist. He
selected the pseudonym of one of these netizens to download a song. During this process,
the representative from the IFPI, used a special software that allowed him to identify the
IP address used by the netizen.
Following this, the different IAPs were asked to identify the person who, at the date and
hour pointed out, had used the IP address identified by the IFPI, in order to contact them.
The IFPI then asked the IAPs to send to the person concerned a warning letter with a
request to stop disseminating the songs and to delete them from their hard disk. If this
letter is found not be effective, the IFPI would report the crime to the Office of Public
Prosecutor (le parquet).
The opinion of the Belgian Data Protection Authority analyses therefore the compati-
bility of investigations against Intellectual Property rights’ crimes, committed on the
Internet, with the legislation protecting personal data and telecommunications.
This document states, first, that IP addresses can be considered as personal data. It
analyses the qualification of this data as ‘judicial data’, considering that processing is
prohibited except given certain conditions regulated by the Belgian law. Second, it analyses
the telecommunication framework concerning personal data and the principle of
confidentiality.
The opinion of the Belgian Data Protection Authority concludes that an IAP cannot
communicate the personal data related to their subscribers to third persons, except in the
frame of a judicial procedure. Further, given the legal state-of-the-art, it is up to the judicial
authorities, to make all investigations, in order to constitute a list of persons responsible for
crimes against intellectual property rights.36
This same reasoning was confirmed in the French case ‘Metrobus c. Ouvaton’.37 Here,
an ISP that hosted a site where certain illegal activity was conducted, was asked by the
plaintiff to identify the creators of this site, since it was causing him damage. The defendant
refused to do this without an authorization issued by a judge, because he was constrained
by non-disclosure of personal data obligations imposed by the Criminal Code.
Territorial Scope of Application
Article 4 of the Directive describes the connecting factors that will make national laws
applicable:38
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1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where:
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of
the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same controller is
established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary
measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obliga-
tions laid down by the national law applicable;
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State’s territory, but in a place
where its national law applies by virtue of international public law;
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise,
situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used
only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community.
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1(c), the controller must designate a
representative established in the territory of that Member State, without prejudice to
legal actions which could be initiated against the controller himself.
What are the Rights of the Data Subject?
The data subject has the following rights (which suppose correlative obligations for the
data controller vis-à-vis them):
(1) To receive certain information before the collection of personal data.39
The controller has to inform the data subject about:
• his identity,
• the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended,
• the recipients or categories of recipients of the data (if appropriate),
• the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him,
etc.
The controller has to inform, at the time of the collection of the data, and in the case when
the data has not been obtained directly from the data subject. In the case of the Internet,
this obligation is normally fulfilled through a Privacy Policy. A link to the policy must be
present in every page. Information of clickstream data collection, formulaires where
personal data is required (the character—mandatory or not—of the provision of these
data), use of e-mail, etc., has to be given as well as the purposes for this processing.
(2) Right of access.
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller:
Without constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense:
—confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and
information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of data
concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are
disclosed,
—communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and
of any available information as to their source,
—knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him
at least in the case of automated individual decisions.40
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The exercise of the right of access, however, does not proceed in the case of an indirectly
identifiable data subject, since, the data controller can not identify him by his own (see
above).
The situation would be different, if the data subject has suspicions about whether the
data controller would have combined data from different sources, making possible his
identification. In this second hypothesis, particular attention has to be paid, to Article 15
of the Directive, in the case automated individual decisions be taken.41
(3) Right of rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not
comply with the provisions of the Directive.42
This is a consequence of the right of access, and allows the data subject to control the
regularity, legality, and accuracy of the data processed about him.
(4) Right not to be subject to automated individual decisions.43
What are the Obligations of the Data Controller?
Conditions for Processing Personal Data
Controllers must respect five basic principles relating to the quality of data. Personal data
must be:
(1) Processed fairly and lawfully.44
‘Fair’ processing requires transparency. An individual’s personal data cannot be processed
for any hidden or secret reason. The concretization of this principle can be seen in the
obligation to inform the data subject about the identity of the controller, the purposes of
the processing, etc.
‘Lawful’ processing requires compliance with national provisions. For example, disclos-
ure may be lawful only when authorized by the national law, for example, in the case of
preservation orders related to traffic data.
(2) Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in
a way incompatible with those purposes.45
(3) Adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected and/or further processed.46
This concept is strictly connected to and conditioned by the purpose of the processing
activity. It will determine the content and the amount of data that can be collected. So, in
case that the system administrator, declares in the Privacy Policy, that he/she collects
clickstream data for the normal administration of the site (eg to know what are the
most visited pages), he/she will not be authorized to connect this data to other personal
data (eg data-mining of IP addresses) in order to know more about the characteristics of
the visitors.
(4) Accurate, and when necessary, kept up to date.47
Data are inaccurate, if they contradict objective truth or findings, or if they are incomplete.
The mere fact of storing IP addresses in logfiles does not give place for inaccuracies.
Attention to this principle should be given, if further processing is done with this data that
could incur lack of precision or need updating.
(5) Kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no longer than necessary
for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further
processed.48
M. V. Pérez Asinari240
In general, the necessity has to be determined in connection with the purpose. Nevertheless,
it can also be determined by law, as we will see hereinafter, for example, in the case of
traffic data conservation and/or retention.
What Makes Data Processing Legitimate?
Personal data may be processed only if:
(1) The data subject has unambiguously given his consent.49
The Directive defines the ‘consent of the data subject’ as ‘any freely given specific and
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to
personal data relating to him being processed’.50
A ‘freely given’ consent means the absence of any kind of pressure. ‘Specific’ means that
the consent for the processing of certain data does not authorize the controller to process
data for other purposes without obtaining the consent again. ‘Informed’ means that the
data subject is aware of the processing activities that his data will be subject to, as the
controller has given proper details about it.
On the Internet, the consent of a data subject can be gathered through proper infor-
mation given, for example, in the form of privacy policies. A visible hyperlink not only in
the home page, but on every page, will bring the visitor to a description page containing
the policy. This statement will indicate to the surfer that continuing the visit of this website
involves the consent to the processing described (of course this processing has to be lawful
and legitimate as mentioned above). However, this way of obtaining consent, can be
questioned in what concerns the ‘informed’ characteristic, mainly in those cases where the
privacy policy is mentioned in small letters, at the end of the website, hidden by misleading
terms such as ‘legal’, ‘policies’, etc. To conclude that the consent has been gathered in an
‘informed’ way in those cases, the visitor has to be given a conspicuous possibility to read
the privacy policy.
(2) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is
party;51 [or]
In the instance of IAPs, logging of data can be justified for the fulfilment of contractual
obligations (this is one of the justifications, then we will have the use of exceptions under
Article 13.1 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC, see below).
As a general principle, the controller should be able to prove the ‘necessity’ of the
processing for the conclusion or execution of the contract.
In the case of an e-commerce operation, the data required should be those needed for
deliverance of the product. If the transaction deals with the provision of a service, only
those data necessary for the controller to comply with the obligation, may be asked for in
order to be justified under this premise.
(3) Processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller
is subject;52 [or]
This is the case of IAPs who are obliged by law to store traffic data for certain amount of
time (retention and preservation).
(4) Processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject;53 [or]
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This condition has, prima facie, no relevance for the scope of CTOSE.
(5) Processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest
or in the exercise of an official authority vested in the controller or in a third party
to whom the data are disclosed;54 [or]
This regulation is applicable to processing activities carried out mainly in the public sector.
For instance, this is the case of processing made by the police, judicial power, etc.
(6) Processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except
where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject that require protection under Article 1.55
This regulation thus provides the possibility for the controller to process personal data
when he/she or a third party, has a ‘legitimate interest’ to do so. To maintain the balanced
required by the Directive and guarantee effective competition, Member States have to
determine the circumstances in which personal data can be processed in this context.56 This
is a very useful tool for the business sector.
The balance will be made first by the controller. If the data subject objects it, and in the
case that they do not reach an agreement, the case would be submitted to the National
Data Protection Authority for interpretation, and in the last case, to a judge.
Other Obligations
Further to the obligations already described, the data controller must implement security
measures against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unautho-
rized disclosure or access, in particular, where the processing involves the transmission of
data over a network.57 They also must notify58 the national data protection authority before
any processing operation (Member States may simplify or exempt data controllers from this
obligation given certain circumstances. System administrators have to evaluate which kind
of processing they make and confront them with the requirements and exceptions foreseen
in the applicable national law as regards the obligation of notification).
Exceptions and Restrictions to the Rights and Obligations
Privacy and the protection of personal data are not absolute rights. They can be limited
when a balance is necessary to safeguard other important public policy interests, such as
the case of the fight against crime. As a consequence, both Directives 95/46/EC59 and
2002/58/EC60 describe the requisites that should be respected when limiting the protected
rights. These rules follow the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms61 and the doctrine of the European Court of Human
Rights.
For instance, Directive 95/46/EC stipulates that:
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and
rights (principle of legitimate purpose, information to the data subject, right of access62)
when such a measure constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard:
(a) national security;
(b) defence;
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(c) public security;
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or
breaches of ethic for regulated professions;
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European
Union, […];
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with
the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e);
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.
Obligation to Store Traffic Data63
An example of an exemption to certain obligations contained in personal data protection
rules is the regulation concerning the retention of traffic data. Within CTOSE, consider-
ation must be given to the regulation as regards traffic data storage, because this data
would be necessary to make an eventual link between an IP address and a given user.
‘Traffic data’ is defined as ‘any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a
communication on an electronic communications network or for the billing thereof’.64
Directive 2002/58/EC foresees65 that interception or surveillance of communications and
the related traffic data is prohibited, except when legally authorized in accordance with
article 15.1. We have to remember that it is a legal principle to interpret ‘exceptions’
restrictively.
The principle is that traffic data must be erased or made anonymous when it is no longer
needed for the purpose of the transmission of a communication, here again, without
prejudice to Article 15.1.
We have to point out that both Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC are instruments
regulating the protection of fundamental rights, so they determine the conditions to follow
when restricting them, but not the restrictions themselves. It is for other kind of Conven-
tions or laws to do so.
This is the case of the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-crime which determines
that Parties shall adopt legislative measures to order a person to preserve and maintain
specified computer data, including traffic data, for a period of time as long as necessary, up
to a maximum of 90 days.
It is important to distinguish between ‘retention’ and ‘preservation’. The first one is made
ex ante, which means systematically and during a certain period. It includes traffic data but
not content data. The second one is made ex post, which is after a disputed event has
happened, and includes content data. This last notion is the one used in the Cyber-crime
Convention. It involves ‘freezing’ the data already stored, through a ‘preservation order’
(warrant). Member States have no harmonized regulations in this arena, so the study of
national laws is indispensable.
Suspicious Phase and Investigation Phase
In these phases the web administrator and the IAP are subject to the same obligations as
in the Running phase. However, the stipulations of Article 13.1 of Directive 95/46/EC and
Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC are relevant in what concerns the restrictions of the
rights and obligations provided in those texts (see above).
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This implies, for instance, that the request to the IAP to connect the IP address found in
the logfile of a web administrator involved in a cyber-attack with the personal data
necessary to identify the user (client of the IAP), will only be legally done with a warrant
issued by a judge. That will exempt the data controller of his obligation of confidentiality.
The same can be said as regards traffic data. The principle is to erase it or make it
anonymous when it is no longer needed for the purpose of the transmission of a
communication, but, being that this data is necessary in the fight against cyber-crime to
identify wrongdoers, many countries have adopted legislation limiting this obligation.
Applicable Legislation in Criminal Cases as Regards Personal Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC is a first pillar instrument regulating the internal market. When it was
transposed to national systems, many countries extended the application of the national
law to their whole legal system, because of their respect for the Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data No. 108, which is indeed applicable to the whole legal system. That means
that the scope of the national laws is irrespective of the scope of the Directive, being
broader and covering the processing of personal data even in those areas excluded from
Directive 95/46/EC, such as criminal law.
In the context of the Council of Europe instruments, consideration will be taken of the
Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States regulating
the use of personal data in the police sector. This is not a mandatory instrument but it gives
guidelines to governments on this issue.
In the EU context, the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) establishes
a European Police Office, which liases with national units in each Member State. It aims
to improve the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member
States combating serious forms of international crime. It regulates a computerized system
of collected information and the applicable data protection rules.
In the future, the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against
information systems66 and its relation with privacy legislation will have to be considered,
as well as the reference it makes to Convention 108. The objectives of the (Draft) Council
Framework Decision are to approximate criminal law in the area of attacks against systems
and to ensure the greatest possible police and judicial co-operation in the area of criminal
offences related to attacks against information systems. Moreover, this proposal con-
tributes to the efforts of the EU in the fight against organized crime and terrorism. The
legal basis of this Framework Decision is Title VI of the European Union Treaty (police
and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, third pillar issues).
What are the Risks for Violation of Data Protection Rules?
We can identify three risks for violation of data protection rules in the context of the
CTOSE project: civil liability, criminal liability and inadmissibility of e-evidence.
Civil Liability
Every person has the right to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to
him by the national personal data protection law applicable to the processing in question.67
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Then, if the data subject suffers damage as a result of unlawful processing of his/her
personal data, he/she is entitled to receive compensation from the controller.68 ‘The
controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he proves that he is
not responsible for the event rise to the damage.’69 Grimalt Servera considers that this
regime creates a liability without fault system.70
Criminal Liability
The punishment for violations to the national laws transposing the Directive will be
different in the Member States, because this area of law is not harmonized within the EU
(procedural law, criminal law).71
Many European personal data protection laws penalize the perpetrators of violation of
data protection principles with fines and/or imprisonment. In Table 1 we can see some
examples of criminal sanctions for violation to data protection obligations.
There has been a recent case in France where a person was condemned by a Criminal
Court of Appeal because of non-declaration of personal data processing to the CNIL, an
infraction that is penalized by Articles 226-16 and 226-31 of the French Criminal Code, and
Articles 16 and 41 of the Act 78-16 of 6.1.1978.72
Inadmissibility of E-evidence
In a vertical relation (State–citizen) strict consideration to Article 8.2 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘EHRC’)
must be made. If evidence has been gathered by Law Enforcement Agents (LEA) limiting
an individual’s privacy, such evidence collection must be both ‘in accordance with the law’
and (that law must be) ‘necessary in a democratic society’ as set forth by the second
paragraph of Article 8 (EHRC) to be admissible. Otherwise the evidence risks being
declared inadmissible. This has been confirmed on many occasions by the European
Human Right Court: ‘The expression “in accordance with the law” requires, firstly, that
the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; secondly, it refers to the
quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person
concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him, and that it is
compatible with the rule of law […] The Court notes that Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 contains provisions concerning covert surveillance on police premises.
However, at the relevant time, there existed no statutory system to regulate the use of
covert listening devices by the police on their own premises. The interference was not
therefore “in accordance with the law” as required by the second paragraph of Article 8
and there has been a violation of this provision. In these circumstances, an examination of
the necessity of the interference is no longer required.’73
In a horizontal relation (e.g. between private entities) the parameters of Article 8 (EHRC)
have to be respected as well. In the Belgian labour dismissal case ‘Depresseux c. s.a.
Creaspace & Masereel’, the judge rejected the employer’s claim since the evidence was
gathered in violation of Article 8 (EHRC) and Article 29 of the Belgian Constitution. In this
case, the employer discovered, by secretly inspecting the employee’s computer-control of
e-mails, that his employee was conducting a parallel activity, unrelated to his job. The
Court considered that employees have, even during working time, the right to privacy,
which implies the right to secrecy of correspondence. By consequence, evidence collected in
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Table 1 Examples of criminal sanctions for violation to data protection obligations
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violation of those rights can not be accepted.74 Notwithstanding, the judge did not consider
the violation to the Belgian law on personal data protection, in the specific sense.
However, it must be assessed to what extent the use of electronic evidence, including
e-traces, collected and processed in violation of personal data protection legislation can
undermine the validity of this evidence. The answer to this question will suppose a
thorough study of national case law, as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. We cannot make general statements since the admissibility or inadmissibil-
ity of the evidence will vary considering the very circumstances of the case and the national
procedural system. As far as we know, there has been little decisive case law analysing the
validity of electronic evidence gathered in violation of data protection rules in Europe.
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which includes the fundamental right to
data protection can also be considered in this realm. Even if this instrument is not yet
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binding, we may wonder what will be its influence in the admissibility of evidence gathered
in violation of the very principles expressed in Article 8 (e.g. fair processing, for specified
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law, right of access and rectification).
One could imagine the case of a system administrator who keeps the logfiles of the
HTTP server and other data collected via his e-commerce site, but who had not notified the
national DPA of this processing activity, and had not informed visitors about his identity,
the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended, and the existence of the
right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him.75 The data he collected
via the e-commerce site was notably excessive in relation with the purpose of delivering a
product. He used these data to make profiles of the consumers and send them advertising
via different channels. He suffers an attack and, using the logfile he can identify the IP
address of the attacker. Considering that the administrator had business problems with
certain customers who were very disappointed with his products, he suspects that one of
them could be the wrong doer. In several cases, the data of the logfile can be connected
(using a data mining technique) with the data of the e-commerce transactions. The system
administrator identifies the attacker, files a criminal complaint and presents this evidence.
Can we infer that there is a risk of inadmissibility of this evidence because of the violation
of the obligations imposed by the data protection law? We cannot give a definite answer
because, as we have already said, any decision will be based on the specific facts of the case
and national procedural law.
However, here there could be a certain risk of inadmissibility because the obligations
imposed by the data protection law to the data controller have not been respected,
and the collection of the evidence was made in a state of violation to the law. We
could consider, nevertheless, a Belgian case law that states that evidence that has
been collected illegally can not be used as such but may be used as the basis for the
accusation (‘la preuve d’une infraction diffère de la communication d’un délit [en ce qu’]
une communication ne peut ĉtre tenue pour inexistante’)76. Further research would be
necessary on procedural law issues and on a national basis to be able to give a more
accurate answer.
Even if this case is quite unlikely to happen in reality (hackers are not as naive as the one
in the example), it is important to visualize that specific problems can arise from the lack
of complaint with the positive obligations derived from the data protection legislation,
which in EU countries is considered to be of public order.
We can wonder then, what would happen if having obtained the IP address of the
attacker from his logfile (which was kept for security reasons, for statistic purposes and not
for matching with other data) the system administrator files a complaint and the LEA
proceeds with a warrant to request the IAP (after having identified him using the Whois
service) to connect this IP number with the data of the user to whom this IP address was
attributed.
In this second hypothesis, the risk of inadmissibility is reduced. First of all, when the
data subject can only be identified indirectly, certain obligations like notification,
information, or access, are reduced, and even, in certain circumstances, not
directly applicable (to be checked at national level). Second, considering that the LEA
intervened with a warrant, the risks for the rights to privacy and personal data are reduced
also, since, a judge has evaluated that the identification be made in accordance with the
law.
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Concluding Remarks
Despite this very general and brief approach to the relation between personal data
protection legislation and electronic evidence handling, we could highlight the obligations
that should be taken into account by the data controllers and the legal risks that could
exist, eventually, if personal data is not legally processed.
After our experience in the CTOSE project we realize that non-lawyers, who normally
handle electronic evidence, tend to identify privacy and personal data protection with
confidentiality and security measures. This derives from the false belief that by complying
with the last two obligations they respect the law. However, all the other obligations ruled
in the Directive have to be taken into account by system administrators and other people
intervening in activities dealing with electronic evidence handling. These obligations should
not be neglected when designing any tool or methodology aimed at handling evidence or
fighting against illegal on-line activities (e.g. intrusion detection systems).
Considering that procedural law is not harmonized at EU level, further research would
be encouraged to better determine the intrinsic interaction between the violation of positive
data protection obligations and the inadmissibility of electronic evidence obtained as a
consequence of that violation.
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Monde, 10 May 2002, p 20.
5 Specially in the SMEs sector, even the data controller (web site administrator) may be unaware
about the fact that he/she is collecting personal data, since logfiles are created by default (see the
concept of ‘personal data’ and ‘data controller’).
6 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, OJ L 281, 23 November 1995. Hereinafter: ‘the Directive’.
7 Further information about the Process Model ‘phases’ can be found at http://www.ctose.org.
8 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector, OJ L 201, 31 July 2002.
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38 We will not develop the applicable law implications in this paper.
39 Articles 11 and 12 of Directive 95/46/EC.
40 Article 12(a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
41 L Bygrave ‘Minding the machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated
Profiling’ Computer Law & Security Report, Vol 17, pp 17–24, 2001.
42 Article 12(b) and (c) of Directive 95/46/EC.
43 Article 15.1 of Directive 95/46/EC.
44 Article 6(1)a of Directive 95/46/EC.
45 Article 6(1)b of Directive 95/46/EC.
46 Article 6(1)c of Directive 95/46/EC.
47 Article 6(1)d of Directive 95/46/EC.
48 Article 6.1.e) of Directive 95/46/EC.
49 Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
50 Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC.
51 Article 7(b) of Directive 95/46/EC.
52 Article 7(c) of Directive 95/46/EC.
53 Article 7(d) of Directive 95/46/EC.
54 Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46/EC.
55 Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC.
56 Recital 30 of Directive 95/46/EC.
57 Article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC
58 Article 18 of Directive 95/46/EC
59 Article 13.1 of Directive 95/46/EC. See also Recitals 43, 44, and 45 of the Directive.
60 Article 15.1 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
61 Article 8.2: ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
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